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Abstract
Civic crowdfunding (CC) is a practice with which interested players can raise funds for a civic
project. With Blockchains gaining traction, CC can be implemented in a reliable, transparent
and secure manner with smart contracts. Fundamental challenge in CC is free riding. PPR,
the proposal by [Zubrickas, 2014] of refund bonus to the contributors in the case of the project
not getting provisioned has interesting properties. As observed by [Chandra et al, 2016], PPR
faces a challenge of race condition. To address this, their proposal, PPS considers the temporal
aspects of a contribution. However, PPS is computationally complex and is difficult to explain
to a layperson. In this work, we look for all important properties a refund bonus scheme
must satisfy in order to discourage free riding while avoiding the race condition. We identify
Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity as sufficient conditions for this. We propose
three refund bonus schemes satisfying these two conditions leading to three novel mechanisms
for CC - PPRG, PPRE, and PPRP. We show that PPRG is the most cost-effective mechanism,
when deployed as a smart contract. We then prove that under certain assumptions on valuations
of the players, in PPRG, the project is funded at equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a project by raising voluntary contributions from a large
pool of interested players and is an active area of research [2, 17, 3, 14]. Players are incentivized to
contribute towards crowdfunding for private projects by offering them rewards. Using crowdfunding
in order to raise funds for civic (non-excludable) goods, however, introduces the free riding prob-
lem - since players cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the public project, strategic
players may not contribute. If this challenge can be addressed, civic crowdfunding (CC) can lead
to greater democratic participation. It also contributes to citizens’ empowerment as it allows them
to collectively increase their well-being by solving societal issues. In this paper, we focus on solving
the challenge of free riding in CC implemented using Blockchain based smart contracts.
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With the advancement of the blockchain technology, crowdfunding projects are now being de-
ployed using smart contracts. A smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate,
verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract [15]. Since a crowdfunding project
as a smart contract is on a trusted publicly distributed ledger, it is open and auditable, making the
contributions of the players and the execution of the payments transparent as well as anonymous. In
addition, as there is no need for any centralized, trusted third party, this reduces the cost incurred
in setting up the project. [18] and [16] are examples of decentralized crowdfunding platforms on
public blockchains like Ethereum. In this paper, our focus is to study game-theoretic challenges in
CC, especially over blockchain. Our work builds on the literature which studies the lack of proper
incentives for contributions towards public goods. Over the years, researchers have addressed such
interaction as a game and analyzed equilibrium strategies of the players in it [4, 7, 8, 20].
In the baseline approach, the social planner uses the voluntary contribution mechanism with
a provision point, provision point mechanism ([4]). The social planner sets up a target amount,
referred as provision point, to be raised. If the contributions by the players crosses this provision
point, the project is executed. Otherwise, the contributions are returned. The mechanism has had
a long history of applications. However, it has been shown to consist of several inefficient equilibria
[4, 5, 13].
Provision Point mechanism with Refund bonus (PPR) by [20] introduces an additional refund
bonus to be paid to the contributing players, along with their contributions, in case the project is
not provisioned. This refund bonus induces a simultaneous move game in PPR in which the project
is provisioned at equilibrium. PPR fails in settings such as Internet-based online platforms since
in such a setting player can observe the current amount of funds raised. Hence, in online settings,
strategic players in PPR would choose to wait and free ride till the end to check if the project is
provisioned and would contribute only in the end in anticipation of a refund bonus. This leads to a
scenario where every strategic player is trying to compete for a refund bonus at the deadline. We
refer to this scenario as a race condition. In online settings, as the players can observe the history
of the contributions, it induces a sequential game, and hence we refer to these settings as sequential
settings.
Provision Point mechanism with Securities (PPS) by [7] introduced a class of mechanisms using
complex prediction markets [1] which incentivizes a player to contribute as soon as it arrives at
the crowdfunding platform, thus resolving the race condition. The challenge with the practical
implementation of PPS is, as it uses complex prediction markets, it is not only difficult to explain
to a layperson but also computationally expensive to implement, primarily as a smart contract.
The introduction of refund bonus is essential in these mechanisms as it incentivizes players to
contribute and helps avoid free riding. Hence, in this paper, we focus on provision point mechanisms
with refund bonus for CC. We look for refund bonus schemes that can avoid free riding as well
as the race condition. The goal is to identify a class of refund bonus schemes satisfying a set of
conditions i.e., Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity, which are sufficient to implement
crowdfunding projects in a sequential setting such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
We propose three novel refund bonus schemes which satisfy these conditions and are clear to
explain to a layperson as well as computationally efficient to implement as a smart contract. With
these three schemes, we design novel mechanisms for CC, namely Provision Point mechanism with
Refund through Geometric Progression (PPRG); Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on
Exponential function (PPRE), and Provision Point mechanism with Refund based on Polynomial
function (PPRP). We analyze the cost effectiveness of these mechanisms, as well as PPS when
deployed as smart contracts and show that PPRG is the most cost effective. We measure the perfor-
mance of these mechanisms by provision accuracy, the fraction of the projects that are successfully
provisioned using the mechanism. We further simulate PPRG, PPRE, PPRP, and PPS and show
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that PPRG has similar provision accuracy as PPS. In the next section, we present the required
preliminaries.
2 Preliminaries
We focus on CC projects which involve provisioning of projects without coercion where players
arrive over time and not simultaneously i.e., CC in a sequential setting. Similar to [4, 7, 20], we also
assume that apart from knowing the history of contributions, i.e., the provision point and the total
amount remaining towards the project’s provision at any time, players do not have any information
regarding the project’s provision. Thus, every player’s belief is symmetric towards the project’s
provision. Further, no player has any information about the sequence of player arrivals.
• Model
A Project Maker (PM) puts a proposal for crowdfunding of a civic project P on web based crowd-
funding platform; that is, we are dealing with sequential settings. PM seeks voluntary contributions
towards it. The proposal specifies a target amount H necessary for the project to be provisioned,
referred to as the provision point. It also specifies deadline (T ) by which the funds need to be
raised. If the target amount is not achieved by the deadline, the project is not provisioned and the
contributions are returned.
A set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} are interested in the crowdfunding of P . A Player i ∈ N has
value θi ≥ 0 if the project is provisioned. It arrives at time yi to the project, observes its valuation
(θi) for it and can contribute xi ≥ 0 at time ti, such that yi ≤ ti ≤ T , towards its provision. Let
ϑ =
∑i=n
i=1 θi, C =
∑i=n
i=1 xi be the sum of the contributions and h
t as the amount that remains to
be funded at time t.
A project is provisioned if C ≥ H and not provisioned if C < H at the end of deadline T . B is the
budget kept aside by the PM to be distributed as a refund bonus among the contributors, if the
project is not provisioned. This setup induces a game among the players.
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be the vector of strategy profile of every player where Player i’s strategy
consists of the tuple σi = (xi, ti), such that xi ∈ [0, H] is its voluntary contribution to the project
at time ti ∈ [yi, T ]. We use the subscript −i to represent vectors without Player i. The payoff for a
Player i with valuation θi for the project, when all the players play the strategy profile σ is pii(σ; θi).
Let IX be an indicator random variable which takes the value 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise. Then
the payoff structure for a provision point mechanism with a refund bonus scheme R : σ → Rn with
budget B, for every Player i contributing xi and at time ti, will be
pii(σ; θi) = IC≥H(θi − xi) + IC<H (Ri(σ)) , (1)
where Ri(σ) is the share of refund bonus for Player i as per the refund bonus scheme R(σ). Let
R(σ) = (R1(σ), . . . , Rn(σ)) be the Refund Bonus Scheme for a provision point mechanism. We use
R(·) to denote a refund bonus scheme and Ri(·) to denote Player i’s share of the refund bonus as
per R(·) whenever the inputs are obvious.
• Important Definitions
Definition 1 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE)). A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is
said to be a Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if for every Player i, it maximizes the payoff
pii(σ
∗; θi) i.e., ∀i ∈ N ,
pii(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i; θi) ≥ pii(σi, σ∗−i; θi) ∀σi,∀θi.
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The strategy profile for the Nash Equilibrium is useful in a simultaneous move game. However, for
sequential settings, where the players can see the actions of the other players, they may not find it
best to follow the PSNE strategy. For this, we require a strategy profile which is the best response
of every player at any time during the project i.e., the best response for every sub-game induced
during it. Such a strategy profile is said to be a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)). A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is said
to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium if for every Player i, it maximizes the payoff pii(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i|Hyi ; θi)
i.e. ∀i ∈ N ,
pii(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i|Hyi ; θi) ≥ pii(σi, σ∗−i|Hyi ; θi) ∀σi,∀Ht,∀θi.
Here, Ht is the history of the game till time t, constituting the players’ arrivals and their contribu-
tions and σ∗−i|Hyi indicates that the players who arrive after yi follow the strategy specified by σ
∗
−i.
Informally it means that, at every stage of the game, irrespective of what has happened, it is Nash
Equilibrium to follow the SPE strategy for every player.
3 Related Work
We focus on the class of mechanisms which require the project to aggregate a minimum level (Pro-
vision Point) of funding before the PM can claim it. There is an extensive literature on the design
for mechanisms with provision points for CC. [12] incentivizes player contribution for civic projects
using state lotteries such that a higher contribution leads to a higher likelihood of winning. The
game induced attains a unique equilibrium. In [11], players contribute in a round-robin fashion
such that an equilibrium exists where a player contributes iff other players make their equilibrium
contributions. Our work is most closely related to the PPM, PPR and PPS mechanisms.
3.1 Provision Point Mechanism (PPM)
PPM [4] is the simplest mechanism in this class where players contribute voluntarily. Players gain a
positive payoff only when the project gets provisioned and a payoff of zero otherwise i.e., RPPM (σ) =
((0) | ∀i ∈ N). Then the payoff structure of PPM, for every Player i, is,
pii(·) = IC≥H × (θi − xi) + IC<H × 0
where, pii(·) and xi are Player i’s payoff and contribution respectively. PPM has been shown to have
multiple equilibria and also does not guarantee strictly positive payoff to the players. It has led the
mechanism to report under-provisioning of the projects [10].
3.2 Provision Point Mechanism With Refund (PPR)
PPM does not guarantee strictly positive payoff for players. PPR [20] improved upon this by offering
refund bonuses to the players in case the project doesn’t get provisioned and rewarded payoff like
PPM otherwise. The refund bonus scheme is directly proportional to player’s contribution and is
given as RPPRi (σ) =
(
xi
C
)
B ∀i ∈ N , where B is the total budget. Then the payoff structure of PPR,
for every Player i, can be expressed as,
pii(·) = IC≥H × (θi − xi) + IC<H ×RPPRi (σ).
In PPR, a player has no knowledge of other players’ contribution. This results in a simultaneous
move game. PPR applied in a sequential setting where players can see contributions from everyone,
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Mechanism Refund Scheme Parameters Covergence of Sum Based On
PPRG RPPRGi (·) =
(
xi+a×(1/γ)i−1
C+K1
)
B a > 0, 1/γ < 1,K1 =
aγ
γ−1
∑∞
i=1
(
xi + a(1/γ)
i−1) = C +K1 Geometric Progression (GP)
PPRE RPPREi (·) =
(
xi+K2×e−ti
C+K2
)
B K2 > 0
∑∞
i=1(xi) +
∫∞
t=t1
(K2e
−tdt) ≤ C +K2 Exponential Function (EF)
PPRP RPPRPi (·) =
(
xi+K3× 1i(i+1)
C+K3
)
B K3 > 0
∑∞
i=1
(
xi +K3
1
i(i+1)
)
= C +K3 Polynomial Function (PF)
Table 1: Various Refund schemes satisfying Condition 1 and Condition 2 for a Player i.
would collapse to a one shot simultaneous game which leads to the race condition, which we define
as,
Definition 3 (Race Condition). A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is said to have a race condition
if ∃t ∈ [yi, T ]∀i ∈ S, such that S ⊆ N and |S| > 1, the payoff pii(σ∗; θi) is maximum where σ∗i =
(x∗i , t) is the PSNE of the induced game i.e., ∀σi,∀i ∈ S,
pii(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i; θi) ≥ pii(σi, σ∗−i; θi)
where t ∈ [yj , T ] s.t. yj = max
yj
yj∀j ∈ S.
Here, σi = (x
∗
i , ti) ∀ti ∈ [yi, T ].
For PPR, S = N and t = T , i.e., the strategy σ∗i = (x
∗
i , T ) ∀i ∈ N constitutes a set of PSNE
of PPR in sequential game. This is because the refund bonuses here are independent of time of
contribution. Thus, players have no incentive to contribute early. Such strategies lead to the project
not getting provisioned in practice and are therefore undesirable.
3.3 Provision Point Mechanism With Securities (PPS)
PPS [7] addresses the shortcomings of PPR by offering early contributors higher refund than a late
contributor for the same amount. The refund bonus of a contributor is determined using securities
from a cost based complex prediction market [1] and is given as RPPSi (σ) = (r
ti
i −xi) ∀i ∈ N where,
ti and r
ti
i are Player i’s time of contribution and the number of securities allocated to it, respectively.
rtii depends on the contribution xi and the total number of securities issued in the market at the
time contribution ti denoted by q
ti . Then the payoff structure of PPS, for every Player i, can be
expressed as,
pii(·) = IC≥H × (θi − xi) + IC<H ×RPPSi (σ)
To set up a complex prediction market in the context of CC, PPS requires a cost function (C0)
satisfying [7, CONDITIONS 1-4,6-7]. PPS awards every contributing player securities for the project
not getting provisioned. These securities are dependent on the player contribution i.e., greater the
contribution, more the number of securities allocated to the player. Each of these securities pay out
an unit amount if the project is not provisioned. However, setting up such a market and computing
securities to be alloted is computationally expensive and costly to implement as a smart contract.
Hence, we want to look for more desirable refund bonus schemes.
4 Desirable Properties of Refund Bonus Schemes
A desirable refund bonus scheme should not just restrict the set of strategies in a way that the project
is provisioned at equilibrium, but should also incentivize greater as well as early contributions, so as
to avoid the race condition, from all interested players. We constitute these desirable properties as
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the following two conditions for a refund bonus scheme R(σ) where σ = ((xi, ti) | ∀i ∈ N) such that
xi ∈ (0, H], ti ∈ [yi, T ] ∀i ∈ N with budget B and which is continuous and differentiable over x ∀t:
Condition 1 (Contribution Monotonicity). The refund must always increase with the increase in
contribution so as to incentivize greater contribution i.e., R(σ) must be a monotonically increasing
function with respect to contribution xi ∈ (0, H) ∀i ∈ N or
∂Ri(σ)
∂xi
> 0 ∀ti (2)
Condition 2 (Time Monotonicity). The refund must always decrease with the increase in the du-
ration of the project so as to incentivize early contribution i.e., R(σ) must be a monotonically de-
creasing function with respect to time ti ∈ (0, T ) ∀i ∈ N or
Ri(σ) ↓ as ti ↑ and ∃ ti < T, and ∆ti s.t.,
Ri ((xi, ti + ∆ti), σ−i)−Ri ((xi, ti), σ−i)
∆ti
< 0
(3)
We now analyze the consequence of such a refund bonus scheme on the characteristics of the
game induced by it.
4.1 Sufficiency of the Refund Bonus Scheme
Let, G be the game induced by the refund bonus scheme R(·). We require G to satisfy the following
properties:
Property 1. In G, at equilibrium, the total contribution equals the provision point i.e., C = H.
Property 2. G must avoid the race condition.
Property 3. G is a sequential game and possesses sub-game perfect equilibria (SPE).
With these properties, we present the following theorem.
Theorem 1. G is a game induced by a refund bonus scheme R(·) with ϑ > H, in which if R(·)
satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 then Properties 1, 2 and 3 hold.
Proof: In Steps 1, 2 and 3, we show that R(·) satisfying Condition 1 is sufficient to satisfy Property
1 and Condition 2 is sufficient to satisfy Properties 2 and 3.
• Step 1 : As ϑ > H, from Eq. 1, at equilibrium C < H cannot hold, as ∃i ∈ N with xi < θi, at least,
that could obtain a higher refund bonus by marginally increasing its contribution since R(·) satisfies
Condition 1 and B > 0. For C > H, any player with a positive contribution could gain in payoff by
marginally decreasing its contribution. Thus, at equilibrium C = H or G satisfies Property 1.
• Step 2 : Every Player i contributes as soon as it arrives, since R(·) satisfies Condition 2 i.e., ∀i ∈ N ,
pii ((xi, yi), σ−i) > pii ((xi, t), σ−i) ∀t ∈ (yi, T ].
In other words, the best response ∀i ∈ N is the strategy σi = (xi, yi). Thus, as per Definition 3, G
avoids the race condition or G satisfies Property 2.
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• Step 3 : Since G satisfies Property 2, it avoids the race condition. Hence, it can be implemented in
a sequential setting or G is a sequential game.
Now, when a Player i enters the project and C = H, its best response would be contributing 0.
However, if hyi > 0, then its best response is that contribution x∗i in which its provisioned payoff is
equal to its not provisioned payoff. With backward induction, it is the best response for every player
to follow the same strategy in which their provisioned payoffs are equal to their not provisioned
payoffs irrespective of C.
For a Player j entering the project such that hyj < x∗j , its best response will be contributing h
yj .
This is because for a contribution hyj < x∗j , its provisioned payoff will be greater than its not
provisioned payoff. Player j will also contribute the maximum contribution required, hyj , since its
not provisioned payoff increases as its contribution increases. Therefore, contributing an amount
less than hyj will result in a lesser not provisioned payoff for the player. Thus, these strategies form
a set of sub-game perfect equilibria in G or G satisfies Property 3.
4.2 Necessity of the Refund Bonus Scheme
Theorem 1 shows that Condition 1 is sufficient to satisfy Property 1 and Condition 2 is sufficient
to satisfy Properties 2 and 3. We believe that these conditions are not necessary and provide an
argument through the following claims. However, a formal proof remains illusive.
Claim. Condition 1 may not be necessary to satisfy Property 1.
Proof: Observe that, if R(·) does not satisfy Condition 1 then, ∃ xˆ, tˆ s.t.
∂R(·)
∂xˆ
∣∣∣
t=tˆ
≤ 0; ∀i.
However, because of the sequential arrival of the players to the crowdfunding platform, it is trivial
to see that players need not arrive/contribute at tˆ. Thus, the project may still get funded as
∂R(·)
∂xˆ
∣∣∣
t=t′
> 0;∀t′ 6= tˆ;∀i,
where t′ ∈ [0, T ] may still hold. Thus, Condition 1 may not be necessary to satisfy Property 1.
Claim. Condition 2 may not be necessary to satisfy Property 2.
Proof: Observe that, if R(·) does not satisfy Condition 2 then, ∃ tˆ, xˆ for a Player i for which,
pii
(
(xˆ, tˆ), σ−i
) ≥ pii ((xˆ, yi), σ−i) .
However, this may not imply that for every Player j arriving in the interval [yi, tˆ], the equation
pii
(
(xj , tˆ), σ−j
) ≥ pii ((xj , yj), σ−j) ,
will hold as it depends on the magnitude of the contribution as well. Thus, from Definition 3, there
is no guarantee that |S| > 1 and hence the race condition may be avoided. Hence, Condition 2 may
not be necessary to satisfy Property 2.
Claim. Condition 2 may not be necessary to satisfy Property 3.
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Proof: As shown in the previous claim, R(·) need not satisfy Condition 2 to avoid the race condition.
Thus, the notion of a sequential game in G may still hold.
The argument for sub-game perfect equilibria follows similar to Step 3, Theorem 1. Thus,
Condition 2 may not be necessary to satisfy Property 3.
Through this generalized result on refund bonus schemes, we show the following proposition:
Proposition 1. PPS satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2.
Proof: Since every cost function used in PPS for crowdfunding must satisfy
∂(r
ti
i −xi)
∂xi
> 0, ∀i [7,
CONDITION-7], PPS satisfies Condition 1.
For Condition 2, observe that ∀i, from [7, Eq. 6]
(rtii − xi) = C−10 (xi + C0(qti))− qti − xi. (4)
In Eq. 4, as ti ↑, qti ↑ as it is a monotonically non-decreasing function of t and thus R.H.S. of
Eq. 4 decreases since R.H.S. of Eq. 4 is a monotonically decreasing function of qti [7, Theorem 3
(Step 2)]. Thus, PPS also satisfies Condition 2.
Corollary 1. PPS avoids the race condition and thus can be implemented sequentially.
Proof: The authors prove in [7, Theorem 3] that PPS can be implemented sequentially without
using Condition 1 and 2. However, from Proposition 1, and the fact that PPS payoff structure
follows Eq. 1, we see from Theorem 1 that PPS can be implemented in a sequential setting.
In the next subsection, we present three novel refund schemes satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 and
the novel provision point mechanisms based on them.
4.3 Refund Bonus Schemes
Table 1 presents three novel refund schemes for a Player i contributing xi at time ti as well as the
mechanisms which deploy them. Note that, we require all the refund bonus schemes to converge to
a particular sum that can be pre-computed. This convergence allows these schemes to be budget
balanced. The parameters a, γ,K1,K2,K3 and B are mechanism parameters (for their respective
mechanisms) which the PM is required to announce at the start of the project.
The refund schemes presented deploy three mathematical functions: geometrical, exponential
and polynomial decay. RPPRG(·) and RPPRP (·) refunds the contributing players based on the
sequence of their arrivals (similar to PPS), while the refund scheme RPPRE(·) refunds them on the
basis of their time of contribution. This allows us to compare the evolution in the refund share, in
comparison to PPR and PPS, with respect to the increase in time, for a Player i.
Figure 1 depicts the comparison.The evolution in the refund share of PPRG, PPRE and PPRP,
in comparison to PPR and PPS, with respect to the increase in time, for a Player i is depicted in
Figure 1. To compare the refund shares of different schemes we keep Player i’s contribution xi, the
budget B and the provision point H same for all, with K1 = K2 = K3.
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the time at which Player i contributes. For PPRG and
PPRP, this is equivalent to the sequence in which the players contribute, i.e., the axis represents
t˜i, as defined in Claim 2. For PPRE, the horizontal axis is the epoch of time at which Player i
contributes, i.e., ti. For PPS, the horizontal axis is also the sequence of players contributing, just
like in PPRG and PPRP. Each Player t˜j (j˜ < i˜) is issued a constant number of securities, i.e., the
number of outstanding securities in the market increases by a constant number as the number of
players contributing increases.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the refund share for a Player i for different provision point mechanisms.
As evident in Figure 1, the refund scheme of PPRG decreases gradually when compared to refund
schemes of PPRE and PPRP. Thus, PPRG can provide significant refund share for a greater number
of players for the same bonus budget. Thus, it increases the contribution of players towards the
project and the higher chance of it getting provisioned. We now show that PPRG satisfies Conditions
1 and 2.
Claim 1. RPPRG(σ) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
∂RPPRGi (σ)
∂xi
=
B
C +K1
> 0 ∀ti.
Therefore, RPPRG(·) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i.
Claim 2. RPPRG(σ) satisfies Condition 2.
Proof: For every Player i ∈ N arriving at time yi, its share of the refund bonus given by RPPRG(·)
will only decrease from that point in time, since its position in the sequence of contributing players
can only go down, making it liable for a lesser share of the bonus, for the same contribution. Let t˜i
be the position of the player arriving at time yi, when it contributes at time ti. While t˜i will take
discrete values corresponding to the position of the players, for the purpose of differentiation, let
t˜i ∈ R. Now, we can argue that at every epoch of time ti, Player t˜i will contribute to the project.
With this, RPPRG(·) can be written as,
RPPRGi (σ) =
(
xi + a× (1/γ)t˜i−1
C +K
)
B.
Further observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
∂RPPRGi (σ)
∂t˜i
= −
(
a× (1/γ)t˜i
C +K1
)
B < 0 ∀xi.
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Therefore, RPPRG(·) satisfies Condition 2.
Claim 3. RPPRE(σ) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
∂RPPREi (σ)
∂xi
=
B
C +K2
> 0 ∀ti.
Therefore, RPPRE(·) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i.
Claim 4. RPPRE(σ) satisfies Condition 2 ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
∂RPPREi (σ)
∂ti
= −
(
K2B
C +K2
)
< 0 ∀xi.
Therefore, RPPRE(·) satisfies Condition 2 ∀i.
Claim 5. RPPRP (σ) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
∂RPPRPi (σ)
∂xi
=
B
C +K3
> 0 ∀ti.
Therefore, RPPRP (·) satisfies Condition 1 ∀i.
Claim 6. RPPRP (σ) satisfies Condition 2.
Proof: For every Player i ∈ N arriving at time yi, its share of the refund bonus given by RPPRP (·)
will only decrease from that point in time, since its position in the sequence of contributing players
can only go down, making it liable for a lesser share of the bonus, for the same contribution. Let t˜i
be the position of the player arriving at time yi, when it contributes at time ti. While t˜i will take
discrete values corresponding to the position of the players, for the purpose of differentiation, let
t˜i ∈ R. Now, we can argue that at every epoch of time ti, Player t˜i will contribute to the project.
With this, RPPRP (·) can be written as,
RPPRPi (σ) =
(
xi +K3 × 1t˜i(t˜i+1)
C +K3
)
B.
Further observe that ∀i ∈ N ,
∂RPPRPi (σ)
∂t˜i
=
K3B
C +K3
(
− 1
t˜2i
+
1
(t˜i + 1)2
)
< 0 ∀xi.
The inequality follows from the fact that 1
t˜2i
> 1
(t˜i+1)2
as t˜i > 0. Therefore, R
PPRG(·) satisfies
Condition 2.
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Operation
PPS PPRG PPRE PPRP
Operations Gas Consumed Operations Gas Consumed Operations Gas Consumed Operations Gas Consumed
ADD 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6
SUB 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
MUL 2 10 2 10 2 10 3 15
DIV 2 10 1 5 1 5 2 10
EXP(x) 2 10 + 10× (log(x)) 0 0 1 10 + 10× (log(x)) 0 0
LOG(x) 2 365 + 8× (bytes logged) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Gas: 407 (at least) Total Gas: 21 Total Gas: 31 (at least) Total Gas: 31
Table 2: Gas Consumption comparison between PPS, PPRG, PPRE and PPRP for a player. All
values are in Gas units.
4.4 Gas Comparisons
Every smart contract is compiled to a bytecode and is then executed on EVM (Ethereum Virtual
Machine). EVM is sandboxed and completely isolated from the rest of the network and thus,
every node runs each instruction independently on EVM. For executing every instruction, there is
a specified cost, expressed in the number of gas units. Gas is the name for the execution fee that
senders of transactions need to pay for every operation made on an Ethereum blockchain. Gas and
ether are decoupled deliberately since units of gas align with computation units having a natural
cost, while the price of ether fluctuates as a result of market forces. The Ethereum protocol charges
a fee per computational step that is executed in a contract or transaction to prevent deliberate
attacks and abuse on the Ethereum network [9].
We present a hypothetical cost comparison between PPS, PPRG, PPRE and PPRP based on
the Gas usage statistics given in [6, 19]. Towards it, the cost in Gas units is as follows for the
relevant operations: ADD: 3, SUB: 3, MUL: 5, DIV: 5, EXP(x): 10 + 10 ∗ log(x) and LOG(x):
365 + 8 ∗ size of x in bytes. Note that, in PPRG, we can replace an exponential operation with
multiplication operation which is significantly less expensive, by storing the previous GP terms in a
temporary variable.
Table 2 provides a hypothetical cost comparison between PPS, PPRG, PPRE and PPRP based on
the Gas usage statistics given in [6, 19]. The cost in Gas units is as follows for the relevant operations:
ADD: 3, SUB: 3, MUL: 5, DIV: 5, EXP(x): 10+10∗ log(x) and LOG(x): 365+8∗size of x in bytes.
Note that, we need not require any exponential calculations in PPRG. Towards this, the PM
can have a variable (say val) to store the previous GP term. For instance, when the first player
contributes it is allocated a× (1/γ)0. Post this, val = a× (1/γ)0. The second player to contribute
is then allocated a × (1/γ)1 or val × (1/γ) after which val is updated with this value. Thus, in
PPRG, we can replace an exponential operation with multiplication operation which is significantly
less expensive.
For every player, PPRG takes 21 gas units, PPRP takes 31 gas units, PPRE takes at least 31
gas units and PPS takes at least 407 gas units. When implemented on smart contract, PPS is
an expensive mechanism because of its logarithmic scoring rule for calculating payment rewards.
PPRG, PPRP, and PPRE, on the other hand, use simpler operations and therefore have minimal
operational cost
5 Provision Point mechanism with Refund through Geomet-
ric Progression (PPRG)
PPRG incentivizes an interested player to contribute as soon as it arrives at the crowdfunding
platform. In PPRG, for the same contribution of Player i and Player j i.e., xi = xj , the one who
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contributed earlier obtains a higher share of the refund bonus. This difference in shares is allocated
using the terms of an infinite GP series with common ratio < 1. From Table 1, the refund bonus
scheme in PPRG is,
RPPRGi (σ) = pi =
(
xi + a× (1/γ)i−1
C +K1
)
B (5)
∀i ∈ N , B as the total bonus budget allocated for the project by the PM and where σ = ((xi, ti) | ∀i ∈ N).
The values a and γ are mechanism parameters which the PM is required to announce at the start
of the project, with K1 =
aγ
γ−1 .
Equilibrium Analysis of PPRG: We now provide the equilibrium analysis of this mechanism as
the following theorem,
Theorem 2. For PPRG, with the refund pi as described by Eq. 5 ∀i ∈ N , satisfying 0 < B ≤
(H+K1)ϑ−H2−HK1
H+K1
and with the payoff structure as given by Eq. 1, a set of strategies
{
(σ∗i = (x
∗
i , yi)) :
if hyi = 0 then x∗i = 0 otherwise x
∗
i ≤ θi(H+K1)−aB×(1/γ)
i−1
H+K1+B
}
∀i ∈ N are sub-game perfect equi-
libria, such that at equilibrium C = H. In this, x∗i is the contribution towards the project, yi is the
arrival time to the project of Player i, respectively.
Proof. First we claim in Step 1 that RPPRG(·) induces a sequential move game, which possesses
sub-game perfect equilibria. In Step 2 and 3, we characterize the equilibria strategy of Player i
(σ∗i ). We derive the condition for the existence of Nash Equilibrium in PPRG in Step 4. Finally, we
discuss the sub-game perfect equilibria strategies in Step 5.
Step 1 : Since RPPRG(·) satisfies Condition 1 (Claim 1) and Condition 2 (Claim 2) and has a payoff
structure as given by Eq. 1, from Theorem 1 we get the result that PPRG induces a sequential move
game and thus, can be implemented in a sequential setting. Further, PPRG possesses sub-game
perfect equilibria in which the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
Step 2 : From Claim 2, the best response for any player is to contribute as soon as he arrives i.e., at
time yi.
Step 3 : For any player, it’s equilibrium strategy is that x∗i for which its provisioned payoff is no less
than its not provisioned payoff, since the players have symmetric belief. Now,
θi − x∗i ≥ pi =
(
x∗i + a× (1/γ)i−1
C +K1
)
B
⇒ x∗i ≤
θi(H +K1)− aB × (1/γ)i−1
H +K1 +B
The result follows from the fact that at equilibrium C = H.
Step 4 : Summing over x∗i ≤ θi(H+K1)−aB×(1/γ)
i−1
H+K1+B
, ∀i we get,
B ≤ (H +K1)ϑ−H
2 −HK1
H +K1
.
as
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = H. From the above equation, we get
0 < B ≤ (H +K1)ϑ−H
2 −HK1
H +K1
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as the condition for existence of Nash Equilibrium for PPRG.
Step 5 : Consider a Player i arriving at C = H, then its best response is contributing 0. If C < H,
then irrespective of the value of C, the set of strategies x∗i , as defined in the theorem, ∀i ∈ N form
the set of sub-game perfect strategies as shown in Theorem 1.
5.1 Equilibrium Analysis of PPRE and PPRP
Theorem 3. For PPRE, with the refund pi as described in Table 1 (in the paper) ∀i ∈ N , ϑ ≥ H C =
H, which satisfies 0 < B ≤ (H+K2)ϑ−H2−HK2H+K2 and has the payoff structure as given by Eq. 1, the set
of strategies
{
(σ∗i = (x
∗
i , yi)) : if h
yi = 0 then x∗i = 0 otherwise x
∗
i ≤ θi(H+K2)−BK2×e
−yi
H+K2+B
}
∀i ∈ N
are sub-game perfect equilibria. In this, x∗i is the contribution towards the project, yi is the arrival
time to the project of Player i, respectively.
Proof. The proof for the theorem follows similar to as presented for Theorem 2. The condition for
the existence of Nash Equilibrium for PPRE is given as,
0 < B ≤ (H +K2)ϑ−H
2 −HK2
H +K2
.
Theorem 4. For PPRP, with the refund as described in Table 1 (in the paper) ∀i ∈ N , ϑ ≥ H C =
H, which satisfies 0 < B ≤ (H+K3)ϑ−H2−HK3H+K3 and has the payoff structure as given by Eq. 1, the set
of strategies
{
(σ∗i = (x
∗
i , yi)) : if h
yi = 0 then x∗i = 0 otherwise x
∗
i ≤
θi(H+K3)−BK3× 1i(i+1)
H+K3+B
}
∀i ∈
N are sub-game perfect equilibria. In this, x∗i is the contribution towards the project, yi is the arrival
time to the project of Player i, respectively.
Proof. The proof for the theorem follows similar to as presented for Theorem 2. The condition for
the existence of Nash Equilibrium for PPRP is given as,
0 < B ≤ (H +K3)ϑ−H
2 −HK3
H +K3
. (6)
In the next section, we look at implementation aspects of PPRG, PPRE and PPRP in terms of
its provision accuracy with respect to PPS. We also look at the effect of B on the provision accuracy
of all these mechanisms.
6 Simulation Analysis
In this section, we compare PPRG, PPRE, PPRP, and PPS for provision accuracy using a CC
proprietary simulator built in partnership with industry (name hidden for review). In this simulator,
we create a Reinforcement Learning environment for PPRG, PPRE, PPRP, and PPS where players
learn to participate in the mechanisms. Players go through repetitive iterations and learn their best
strategy through rewards distributed by the corresponding mechanism. We run the simulation of 25
players for all the mechanisms and obtain comparison results between PPRG, PPRE, PPRP with
respect to PPS. The results are shown in Figure 2.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Comparison of provision accuracy of PPRG, PPRE and PPRP with PPS for (a) E[ϑ] =
5 ∗H (top) (a) E[ϑ] = 10 ∗H (bottom) and (b) E[ϑ] = 20 ∗H.
Among PPRG, PPRE, and PPRP, it is clear to see that PPRG shows better provision accuracies.
PPRP shows slightly better accuracies for when the total expected valuation (E(ϑ)) is low (5 times
the provision point), but the gain in the accuracy only comes at the expense of a budget very close
to the maximum possible budget (B) which is difficult to get in realistic circumstances.
When compared to PPS, PPRG shows significantly good provision accuracies when E(ϑ) is
high (10 times provision point, for instance). Even when PPS shows slightly higher accuracies, it
again comes at the expense of a budget close to the maximum possible budget, B. However, for a
reasonable budget of approximately 0.5× B or less, both the mechanisms share similar accuracies,
therefore, it is safe to claim that PPS and PPRG performs equally well in terms of provision accuracy
for a rational budget.
7 Conclusion
Motivated by the theoretical guarantees of PPR [20] and PPS [7], we looked for provision point
mechanisms for CC with refund bonus schemes. We introduced two conditions, namely Contribution
Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity, for refund bonus schemes in provision point mechanisms. We
proved that these two conditions are sufficient to implement provision point mechanisms with refund
bonus to possess an equilibrium that avoids free riding and race condition (Theorem 1). With this,
we proposed three simple refund bonus schemes based on geometric progression, exponential and
polynomial functions. With these schemes, we designed novel mechanisms, namely, PPRG, PPRE
and PPRP. We showed that PPRG has much less cost when implemented as a smart contract
over Ethereum framework. We identified a set of sub-game perfect equlibria for PPRG in which the
project is provisioned at equilibrium (Theorem 2). To measure the performance of these mechanisms,
we introduced a notion of provision accuracy. Our simulations showed that, whenever there is a hefty
valuation for the project under consideration, with small refund bonus budgets, PPRG achieves the
same provision accuracy as PPS. We leave it for future work to explore other refund bonus schemes
having simplicity and efficiency as PPRG and much higher provision accuracies when the aggregate
of the players’ valuations is just over target value.
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